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This paper explores the eect of banking market structure on the market structure
of industrial sectors. It asks whether concentration in the banking market promotes
the formation of industries constituted by a few, large rms, or rather, whether it
facilitates the continuous entry of new rms, thus maintaining unconcentrated market
structures across industries. Theoretical arguments could be made to support either
hypotethical scenario. Empirical evidence is derived from a sample of 35 manufacturing
industries in 17 OECD countries, adopting a methodology that allows controlling for
other determinants of industry market structure common across industries or across
countries. Bank concentration is found to enhance industries' market concentration,
especially in sectors highly dependent on external nance. Such eect is however weaker
in countries characterized by higher overall nancial development.
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11 Introduction
Recently, the economic role of banking market power has been the subject of analysis
of a signicant number of both theoretical and empirical contributions. Challenging the
customary view that competition in the banking industryis unequivocally benecial to social
welfare, authors have suggested that concentration of market power may in fact enhance
the role of banks as information producers in their lending activity and their willingness to
establish close lending relationships with their client rms.
The empirical literature has been directed mainly at the eects of bank concentration
on growth performances, either of industrial sectors or of the economy at large.1 This
paper explores empirically a new dimension of analysis by investigating the eect of bank
concentration on the market structure of industrial sectors. Does concentration of market
power in the banking industry lead banks to concentrate funding toward a few rms of large
size, or rather, does bank concentration foster entry of new rms over the life cycle of an
industry, thus contributing to the maintenance of an unconcentrated market structure?
Empirical evidence has been gathered on the eect of bank concentration on average
rm size in 35 manufacturing sectors in 17 OECD countries. It shows that the average
size of rms in sectors more dependent on external sources of nance is disproportionately
larger in countries with a more concentrated banking industry. The evidence also indicates
that such eect is heterogeneous across countries, with the eect being weaker in countries
with stronger indicators of overall nancial development.
The eect of banking market structure on the market structure of industrial sectors
is not a priori obvious. Theoretical priors can be proposed suggesting eects working in
either direction. For instance, Petersen and Rajan [21] argue that banks with market power
facilitate access to credit to young and unknown rms knowing that they will be capable of
extracting future rents from those rms that eventually become protable. Extending this
line of reasoning, one could then posit that, at later stages the bank may have an incentive to
continue the lending relationship with the older clients while constraining the access to credit
of new entrants, since, by increasing market competition, the newcomers would undermine
the protability of industry incumbents. This theoretical argument would then suggest that
bank concentration should enhance industry concentration, especially in sectors that are at
relatively more advanced stages along their life cycle. A separate line of argumentation,
still leading to the same conclusion, would maintain that managers of banks in concentrated
markets may have very close relationships with incumbent clients and may be lead by
1Details on this literature are provided below.
2strategic decisions, not necessarily related to bank's own prot maximization, to continue
support of incumbents at the expense of prospective entrants. Anecdotal corroboration
to this proposition comes, for example, from Lamoreaux [16]'s historical analysis of New
England banking through the nineteenth century, showing how in that period \kinship
networks" regulated the 
ow of bank lending to entrepreneurs. Haber [13] observes a similar
behavioral pattern among Mexican's banks in the late nineteenth century.
In direct contrast with this reasoning, one could argue that in fact banks' ultimate goal
of prot maximization should lead to the opposite strategy of continuously favoring new
entrants that, endowed with higher return projects and more innovative technologies, may
replace the old incumbents and guarantee higher bank prots. According to this alternative
hypothesis, bank concentration should then contribute to industry competition.
The eect of bank concentration on industry market structure is therefore theoretically
ambiguous. Meanwhile, little empirical evidence exists to support either prior. Available
historical studies, albeit limited by their focus on specic countries, periods and socio-
institutional circumstances, give the general impression that bank concentration should be
associated with concentrated industries. For example, in his study of Italian industrial-
ization in the late nineteenth century, Cohen [9] describes the relation between a quasi-
monopolistic banking industry and \...the emergence of concentration of ownership and
control in the new and rapidly growing sectors of the industrial structure". Capie and
Rodrik-Bali [6], note that the intense process of consolidation that characterized British
banking in the early 1890's clearly preceded that observed in other industrial sectors. In his
work cited above, Haber [13] reports a very close connection between a highly concentrated
Mexican banking sector and an equally highly concentrated textile industry. More gener-
ally, in his study on banking in early stages of industrialization, Cameron [4] states that
\...Competition in banking is related to the question of competition in industry. In general
the two 
ourish { and decline { together. Whether this phenomenon is a joint by-product
of other circumstances, or whether it results from the decline or restriction of competition
among banks, is a matter worthy of further research. It is a striking coincidence, in any
case, that industrial structure{competitive, oligopolistic, or monopolistic{tends to mirror
nancial structure."
Informed by these historical references and by theoretical uncertainty, the goal of the
study is then to derive broad empirical evidence which could corroborate either eect of
bank concentration on industry concentration.
The paper contributes directly to the literature on the economic role of banking market
structure. On the theoretical side, Pagano [20] and Guzman [12] suggest that banking
3market power reduces equilibrium credit, thereby generating a negative eect on economic
growth. Petersen and Rajan [21], on the other hand, argue that banks in concentrated
markets have greater incentives to fund young rms with no record of past performance.
Meanwhile, Shaer [23] maintains that the average quality of a bank's loan portfolio declines
as the number of banks competing in the market increases. Cao and Shi [5], Dell'Ariccia
[10] and Manove, Padilla and Pagano [18] claim that the incentives for banks' screening
are higher if they have market power. Cetorelli and Peretto [8] identify simultaneously a
negative role of banking market power on credit quantities and a positive role associated
with a more ecient screening. Among the empirical contributions, Petersen and Rajan
[21] have conrmed that bank concentration is associated with greater credit availability
to younger rms. Shaer [23] nds a negative impact of bank concentration on economic
growth. The impact on the growth in the number of new rms has instead been found
to be either positive (Bonaccorsi and Dell'Ariccia [3]) or negative (Black and Strahan [2]).
Finally, Cetorelli and Gambera [7] nd evidence of an overall negative impact on industry
growth, although with sectors highly dependent on external nance actually beneting from
being in countries with concentrated banking.
None of these contributions focus on the eect of banking market structure on the
market structure of industrial sectors, however. Thus, the present paper complements and
extends this literature.
2 Methodology and model specication
In a recent contribution, Kumar, Rajan and Zingales [15] classify theories of the rm as
technological, organizational and institutional and test several implications of those theories
regarding possible determinants of industry rm size. They identify several industry-specic
and country-specic factors. For instance, the degree of capital intensity, the amount of
employed human capital and the R&D intensity are all possible characteristics, among
many others, that are likely to aect an industry's market structure. Likewise, the quality
of the judicial system, the set of laws and regulation and the level of economic and nancial
development are some of those \environmental" factors, common across industries in a
country, which are also likely determinants of rm size.
This paper adopts a methodology that allows testing the validity of the theoretical
priors regarding the eect of bank concentration on industry rm size controlling for the
simultaneous in
uence of other industry and country factors. As Rajan and Zingales [22]
observed, industrial sectors dier from one another, for technological reasons, in terms of
4the degree of dependence on external sources of nance. Then, it must be the case that
whichever the sign of the relationship between bank concentration and industry rm size,
such eect should be especially strong for sectors that more than others rely on external
nance: If bank concentration leads to the funding of few, large rms, sectors that are highly
dependent on external nance should exhibit, all else equal, rms of larger size if they are
located in countries characterized by high bank concentration. The exact opposite should
be true if instead bank concentration were associated with unconcentrated industries. By
identifying the dierential eect of bank concentration across industries, i.e., by analyzing
the eect of the interaction between bank concentration and industry external nancial
dependence, it is possible to control directly for other industry and country determinants
of average rm size.
In fact, this methodology should also take into account factors that could determine
simultaneously banking market structure and other industries' market structure. For ex-
ample, the size of a country is a likely determinant of market structure across all industries.
If we were trying to identify the eect of bank concentration on an inter-industry average
measure of rm size, then we would question whether any result would simply indicate
an underlying eect of country size on both market structures. By focusing instead on the
dierential eect of bank concentration across industries, we reduce the likelihood that such
a common factor could be the driving force explaining the results. Indeed, while we have
been able to establish a well dened theoretical linkage between bank concentration and
industries at high external nancial dependence, which we can test, it is less obvious why
the size of a country should be only aecting this subset of industries.
The study makes a more sophisticated use of sector specic information. From the
theoretical underpinnings we gather that bank concentration may play a role on industries
market structure by privileging or not clients with which they already have ongoing rela-
tionships. Hence the eect on industry concentration should be found focusing on those
industrial sectors whose mature rms are more dependent on external nance. If the ef-
fect is found to be negative, it would suggest that even in sectors where mature rms are
especially dependent on external nance, banks still allow entry of new rms, thus reduc-
ing the concentration of market shares among old incumbents. If the eect is found to be
positive, this would be evidence that bank concentration indeed contributes to increasing
concentration in industrial sectors.2
2Another reason justifying the focus on the external nancial dependence of more mature rms is pre-
sented in section 3.2.
5The econometric analysis is conducted using the following model specication:
Average firm sizej;k = Constant+ 1  Industry Dummiesj + (1)
+ 2  Country Dummiesk +
+ 3  Share of total manufacturing v:a:j;k +
+ 4  External dependencej  Bank concentrationk +
+ Errorj;k:
Industry average rm size is computed as the natural logarithm of the ratio of total value
added and number of establishments of sector j in country k. Industry and country dum-
mies correct for industry and country xed eects. The share of total manufacturing value
added of sector j in country k is a control variable that should capture factors that de-
termine the market structure of one particular sector in a certain country (e.g., the choice
of specialization in production in a specic sector in a given country). In studies of cross-
sector industrial growth, the share variable consistently predicts that sectors that had grown
substantially in the past, and therefore are already relatively large, grow less in the future
(see Rajan and Zingales [22] and Cetorelli and Gambera [7]). Theories of an industry's
life-cycle predict that a sector that has already grown substantially should experience less
intensive rm entry (see, e.g., Klepper [14]). Therefore, in our study, a larger sector should
be expected to have a larger average rm size, hence 3 should have a positive sign. Fi-
nally, the interaction term captures the eect of bank concentration in country k across
sectors characterized by dierent levels of dependence on external sources of nance. In
the benchmark specication of the model, the external dependence refers to that of the
mature rms in each sector j. As mentioned earlier, from the theoretical background the
eect of banking market structure on industries market structure could be either positive
or negative. Therefore the sign of 4 is a priori ambiguous.
3 Data set
The data on industry market structure is collected from the 1995 Industrial Structure
Statistics data set of the OECD. It contains information on manufacturing sectors at four
digit ISIC level for 22 countries for the years 1986-1994. From this source I have obtained
the series for sectoral value added and number of establishments and computed the measure
of average rm size from the 1994 data or from the most recent year available, typically
one or two years earlier. In addition, average yearly growth rates in value added and in
6number of establishments were also calculated. This data set has then been merged with
that used by Cetorelli and Gambera [7], in turn containing data from Rajan and Zingales
[22]. The matching of the two data sets produced complete information for a total of 35
manufacturing sectors in 17 OECD countries. Bank concentration is the average between
1989 and 1995 of the sum of the market shares of the three largest banks in each country
(see Cetorelli and Gambera [7] for details). The measure of external nancial dependence
is computed for the decade 1980-1990, and it is calculated on U.S. industrial sectors. Rajan
and Zingales [22] argue that the \dependence of U.S. rms on external nance [is] a good
proxy for the demand for external funds in other countries" (Rajan and Zingales [22], p.
563{65). The additional variables used in robustness tests are also for the 1980's decade
or from the early 1990's and they are described when introduced in the presentation of
the results. Table 1 presents summary statistics for all the variables used in the study.
Table 2 shows the pattern of rm size and external nancial dependence across industrial
sectors. The measure of rm size for each sector in that table is an average across countries.
Similarly, Table 3 shows the pattern of rm size and of bank concentration across countries.
The measure of rm size for each country in this other table is an average across sectors.
3.1 Comments on the measure of average rm size
As mentioned above, rm average size is computed as the natural logarithm of the ratio
of total value added and number of establishments of sector j in country k. Two possible
caveats are in order. First, such synthetic measure does not provide information regarding
the distribution of market shares within the sector. However, this is to my knowledge the
best measure of industry market structure available at a suciently disaggregated level (four
digit ISIC code) for a signicant cross section of countries. Kumar, Rajan and Zingales [15]
have used a more sophisticated measure of average rm size exploiting available information
on the size distribution across rms in a sector. However, such information is only available
for industrial sectors at two digits ISIC codes. The trade o is therefore between a better
measure of industry market structure and a worse level of disaggregation across sectors.
Because the sought eects of banking market structure are based on rather \micro-based"
mechanisms, linking bank conduct with individual rms in a sector, the use of a greatly
disaggregated data set seems to be a more appropriate choice.
Another potential caveat in the measure of average rm size is that the data is available
for number of establishments rather than number of rms. To check on the reliability of the
measure of average rm size computed using number of establishments, I have proceeded as
follows. First, for each of the 17 countries in the data set, I have calculated the ranking of
7average rm size across sectors. For industry specic reasons, e.g. economies of scale, one
would expect a \natural" ordering in rm size across sectors, and this ordering should be
kept across countries. This is conrmed by observing the matrix of pairwise rank correla-
tions displayed in the rst block of rows of Table 4. The correlations are all very large and
highly signicant. Next, the 1995 volume of the Industrial Structure Statistics reported
information on number of rms, instead of number of establishments, for two additional
countries, New Zealand and Portugal. I have then computed for these two additional coun-
tries the measures of average rm size and the corresponding ranking across sectors. These
rankings were then compared with those computed for the countries in the data set. As
shown in the bottom rows of Table 4, the pairwise correlations between the rankings for
New Zealand and Portugal { computed using information on number of rms { and those
for the other countries { computed using information on number of establishments { are
remarkably large and very signicant. This indicates that there is a close correspondence
between the measure of average rm size calculated using information on establishments
and that using information on rms.3
Another piece of evidence on the reliability of our measure of average rm size comes
from a comparison with a measure of industrial mark-ups estimated for manufacturing
sectors in a number of countries by Martins, Scarpetta and Pilat [19]4. One should expect
to nd a positive correlation between the two measures: larger rm size should be associated
with higher market concentration, hence greater potentials for higher mark-ups. Conrming
this prior, the correlation between our measure of average rm size and the mark-ups
estimates is 0.36 and highly signicant.5 Moreover, a regression of mark-ups on average rm
size, controlling for industry and country xed eects, produced a positive and signicant
coecient for the average rm size variable, and an R2 = 0:49.
The results of these tests should conrm that our measure of average rm size is a
proper indicator of industry market structure. A reinforcement on the reliability of such
indicator will also come implicitly from the results of some of the robustness tests to the
basic specication of the model. This remark will be pointed out in the presentation of the
results in section 4.4.
3A similar comparison was also made using the ranks based directly on number of establishments and
those based on number of rms. The pairwise correlations, not reported, were also found to be very large
and highly signicant.
4The overlap in data was for 11 countries and 27 manufacturing sectors.
5A correlation with the logarithm of the number of establishments by itself is -0.47, also highly signicant
and consistent with expectations.
83.2 Other observations about the data set
The data set has some characteristics that makes it well suited for the analysis at hand.
First, the countries in the data set are all developed economies with limited variability
in terms of income per capita levels.6 The cross-country similarity in the dimension of
economic development should imply that the same industrial sectors are at similar stages
of their respective life cycle, thus implying a plausible degree of homogeneity across sectors
in dierent countries. This fact is important in that, as mentioned above, the information
on sectors' external nancial dependence, which is common for the same sectors across
countries, is calculated on U.S. data. The underlying assumption in making use of this
industry variable is that sectors across countries should be at comparable stages, in terms
of their life cycle and technology adoption, to those in the United States, an assumption
that should especially hold with this data set.
An additional consideration is that the industrial sectors in the data set all belong to
manufacturing, i.e., these are rather traditional sectors adopting established production
technologies. By all means this observation does not intend to imply lack of technological
changes in those sectors. More simply, the combined fact that these are prevalently tra-
ditional sectors in developed economies should imply that such sectors have already past
the typical infant industry stage, normally characterized by the entry of many young rms
(again, see Klepper [14]), and they are instead likely to be constituted by a dominant pro-
portion of more mature rms. This observation reinforces the justication for focusing on
the external nancial needs of mature rms when we analyze the eect of banking market
structure on average rm size.
4 Empirical results
We begin with a rst round exploration of the data by regressing average rm size on
industry and country dummies. The residuals from this regression were clustered separating
sectors characterized by low dependence on external nance from those highly dependent,
based on whether they are in countries with low or high bank concentration. Low versus
high re
ects values below or above the median in the respective distributions of external
nancial dependence and bank concentration. For each of the four clusters of regression
residuals, mean values were then computed and they are reported in Table 5. For countries
with low bank concentration, the residual rm size of the most dependent sectors is negative,
6Turkey and Mexico are two exceptions, and excluding these countries from the data set will represent
one of the tests of robustness presented later on.
9while that for the least dependent sectors is positive. Instead, in countries with high bank
concentration, sectors highly dependent on external nance have positive residual rm size,
while those at low dependence have negative residual rm size. It appears from this simple
representation of the data that the dierence in rm size between sectors above and those
below the median of external nancial dependence is denitely greater in countries with
high bank concentration. This rst piece of evidence hints that bank concentration may
favor market concentration in sectors that are potentially more dependent on bank nance.7
The remainder of the paper presents estimation results based on the model specication (1),
in the attempt to establish \hard" evidence that would conrm or reject this rst nding.
4.1 Benchmark results
Column (a) of Table 6 presents the results of the basic regression of the model in equation
(1). The dependent variable is the logarithm of average rm size of sector j in country k,
while the interaction term is between the level of external nancial dependence of mature
rms in sector j and the 3-bank ratio in country k. The industry and the country indicator
variables are included in the regressions but their estimates are not reported in the Table.
Unless otherwise reported, these variables remain the same throughout the analysis. As
the Table shows, sectors whose share of total manufacturing value added is greater, are
also, as expected, characterized by a larger average rm size. The estimated eect of bank
concentration, in the benchmark model and in all the robustness tests, is not aected by
the exclusion of this regressor.
Focusing on the bank concentration interaction, the estimation results show a positive
and signicant coecient for it, indicating that, controlling for industry and country specic
factors, sectors highly dependent on external nance have rms of disproportionately larger
average size if they are in countries with high bank concentration.
In principle, the positive and signicant coecient of the interaction could simply in-
dicate that bank concentration has no relationship with rm size and that sectors highly
dependent on external nance are simply characterized by rms of greater average size.
However, it turns out that highly dependent sectors are actually characterized by lower
average rm size than low-dependent sectors. Comparing the mean values, the average rm
size of sectors above the median of the distribution of external nancial dependence is 26%
smaller than sectors below the median.8 If anything, this should dampen the eect of bank
7A similar indication is obtained looking at the mean residuals calculated from a regression in which the
most and the least dependent sectors (top 3 and bottom 3) were excluded.
8A negative correlation between average rm size and external nancial dependence is also found by
10concentration on rm size.
Bank concentration thus seems to contribute to the formation of concentrated industrial
sectors. This nding is consistent with theoretical priors suggesting that banks with market
power may have the tendency to preserve relationships with their older clients, which grow
larger, at the expense of potential new entrants.
4.2 Endogeneity
A concern that may rise in this specication of the model is on the possible endogeneity of
bank concentration. As mentioned above, banking market structure may aect industries
market structure by establishing close ties with incumbent rms that may be detrimental to
new entrants, especially those rms more in needs of external nance. We could not exclude
that a reverse mechanism may also be present or that both market structures be determined
by a common factor. For example, it may be that the observed relationship is identied
because in some countries there is concentration of economic powers in the hands of groups
(political entities, individual families, the government at large), who have interests in some
sectors of productions and can also control the credit 
ows from the nancial industry. The
results of the analysis could be aected if, in fact, concentration of economic powers in
sectors at high external nancial dependence could also extend to the banking industry,
via increasing concentration of market power. Alternatively, one could posit that banking
market structure simply adjusts endogenously to best t the cross-industry characteristics
of a country. For example, a given country could specialize in highly dependent sectors, and
those sectors in that country could be highly concentrated for reasons other than factors
related to the market structure of the banking industry. Suppose also that these sectors
require heavy and indivisible capital investments. Consequently, the banking industry,
whose sources of revenue would depend especially from the industrial sectors that mostly
require external nance, should be highly concentrated in order to accommodate the funding
needs of those sectors.
The eort required to envision possible channels of endogeneity and reverse causality
in the relationship between bank concentration and industries market structure speaks to
the strength of the methodology adopted in this study. While we have clear theoretical
priors to justify and therefore test a possible relationship between bank concentration and
industry concentration in sectors highly dependent on external nance, the opposite direc-
tion of causality is much harder to justify. In any case, as also pointed out in Cetorelli and
Kumar, Rajan and Zingales [15].
11Gambera [7], the market structure of the banking industry is typically determined by sev-
eral independent factors which would have little to do with the market structure of other
industries. For example, the market structure of the banking sector is a favorite policy
variable controlled by the regulator to prevent excessive surplus extraction, or for reasons
related to the safety and soundness of the industry.
Beyond this line of discussion, the concerns regarding the potential endogeneity of the
market structure of the banking sector are resolved by using instrumental variables (IV)
estimation. The following variables were selected as instruments. First, a measure of
regulatory restrictions on the banking industry. This cross-country indicator, assembled by
Barth, Caprio and Levine [1], gives a quantitative assessment of the restrictions on banks to
be active participants in other markets. For example, wether a bank is allowed or not to hold
equity participations of non-nancial companies, and vice versa, or whether or not a bank
can operate in the insurance market. It is likely that the regulatory environment should
have an impact on the market structure of the banking industry. A second instrument is
an indicator of the legal origins of a country (see La Porta [17]), where the presumption
is that dierent legal origins are responsible for dierent set of rules and regulations that
may have had an impact on the market structure of the banking industry. The regression
results in column (b) of Table 6 show that the coecient of the interaction variable remains
positive and signicant, and in fact the point estimate increases.
4.3 Outliers
A rst set of robustness tests were run attempting to identify outliers. To check that the
main ndings are not aected by extreme values in the external dependence distribution,
the benchmark regression was run excluding from the sample the three least dependent
sectors and the three most dependent sectors. As shown in column (a) of Table 7, the bank
concentration interaction term maintains a positive and signicant coecient, with a point
estimate that actually jumps up from 0.84 to 2.40. This is presumably due to the fact
that, as noted above, there is a negative relationship between external nancial dependence
and average rm size, so that cutting the extremes of the external nancial dependence
distribution tilts up the coecient of the interaction term.9
Similarly, another regression was run excluding from the sample the countries with the
three lowest levels and the three highest levels of bank concentration. As shown in column
9Nonetheless, it is still the case that even with the truncated distribution, sectors above the median
in external nancial dependence have smaller average rm size than those below the median (about 17%
smaller rather 26% as in the case with no truncation).
12(b) of Table 7, the bank concentration interaction maintains an unchanged coecient and
remains signicant.
As another test of outliers in
uence, the Cook's D statistic was calculated from the
benchmark regression, and the same regression was then re-run after dropping the observa-
tions corresponding to the top 1% of the Cook's D distribution (5 observations). Column (c)
reports the results of such regression, showing that the coecient of the bank concentration
interaction term remains signicant, although with a point estimate reduced to 0.73.10
As mentioned earlier, one advantage of this data set is the similarity across countries
in terms of economic development conditions. However, Turkey and Mexico, each with
less than 4,000 U.S. dollars, appear as clear outliers in the cross-country distribution of
income per capita, as compared with the other countries, whose lowest value in income
per capita begins at above 10,000 U.S. dollars. The underlying assumption that the same
sectors across countries are at similar stages in their life cycle is less plausible for these
two countries. Column (d) of Table 7 reports the results of the basic model specication
in which the observations related to Turkey and Mexico were dropped. The coecient of
the bank concentration interaction is remarkably stable, and it maintains a high level of
signicance.
Still with the intent of verifying homogeneity in the data set, another regression was run
excluding from the sample non-European countries. The results, displayed in column (e) of
Table 7, show that the bank concentration interaction is still signicant, although with a
lower point estimate.
Another possible consideration is that the average rm size may appear high in some
sectors just because those sectors have experienced a substantial boost in value added growth
in recent years and entry of new rms has not followed yet. For example, in the data set,
the median value in value added growth rate is 4.3%, and the top 10% of the sectors-
countries reported a yearly growth rate above 23%. The identied relationship between the
bank concentration interaction and average rm size could potentially be the result of a
predominance of these high-growth sectors among those ones highly dependent on external
nance. A rst observation of the data set reveals that the high-growth sectors are rather
evenly distributed between sectors below and sectors above the median of the external
nancial dependence distribution. Nevertheless, a regression was run in which sectors that
experienced growth rates in the top 10% of the distribution (59 sectors-countries) were
10Another regression, not reported, in which the observations corresponding to the top 5% of the Cooks
D distribution were cut o (a total of 26 observations), still showed a highly signicant bank concentration
interaction, with an estimated coecient of 0.62).
13excluded from the sample. As the results in column (f) of Table 7 shows, the coecient of
the bank concentration interaction is still highly signicant and approximately the same in
size.11
A related, yet somewhat reversed, consideration could be made observing that the av-
erage rm size may appear low in some sectors because those sectors have experienced
substantial entry of new rms in recent years that has not yet translated in value added
growth. Then the same reasoning as above could apply to question the observed rela-
tionship between the bank concentration interaction and average rm size.12 In the data
set, the median value in growth in number of establishments is -1.1%, but the top 10% of
sectors-countries reported a growth in number of establishments above 7%. As for growth
in value added, sectors that experienced high growth in number of establishments are evenly
distributed across sectors at dierent level of external nancial dependence. A regression
was run where sectors with growth in number of establishments in the top 10% of the dis-
tribution (30 sectors-countries) were excluded from the sample. As shown in column (g) of
Table 7, the bank concentration interaction remains signicant with about the same point
estimate.13
4.4 Does bank concentration proxy for indicators of nancial develop-
ment?
A possible concern is that the market structure of the banking sector may vary at dierent
stages of nancial or institutional development. Consequently, the relationship identied
between the bank concentration interaction and average rm size could actually underlie
a fundamental relationship between industry market structure and general conditions of
development of the nancial sector. To test the robustness of the benchmark result to
this argument, regressions were run by adding to the basic model specication terms of
interaction between external nancial dependence and a number of variables characterizing a
country's nancial sector at large. These variables are a measure of the level of development
of the banking sector, one of general nancial development, a measure of development of
capital markets, and one of the general level of eciency of the judicial system.
11Similar regressions, not reported here, were run dropping sectors ranging from the top 20% in the value
added growth distribution (15% growth rate and above) to the top 1% (81% growth rate and above). They
all yielded qualitatively similar results.
12Another reason to identify high-growth sectors is that such sectors may still be in relatively earlier stages
of their life cycle and therefore may not be considered as mature as the others.
13The result remains robust to changes in the cut o point (regressions with cut o point between 20%
in the growth rate in number of establishments (3%) and 1% (26%) were run yielding qualitatively similar
results).
14With a more developed banking sector, rms should have a broader access to sources of
investment funds. Consequently, sectors more in need of external nance should experience
more rm entry in countries with a more developed banking industry, thus implying a
negative coecient for the bank development interaction term. If bank concentration varies
at dierent stages of bank development, then it might be that the signicant role of bank
concentration identied in the interaction term may simply indicate that highly dependent
sectors display higher average rm size (slower rm entry) in countries with a lower level
of bank development. Consequently, by adding to the benchmark regression the interaction
of external dependence with bank development, the bank concentration interaction term
may become insignicant. Column (a) of Table 8 presents the result of a regression where
the interaction between external nancial dependence and the level of bank development
in each country was added. The measure of bank development is the commonly used ratio
between domestic credit to the private sector and gross domestic product. The result shows
that the bank concentration interaction remains positive and signicant, with a basically
unchanged coecient, while the bank development interaction is not signicant.
However, the overall availability of credit to rms may depend on the level of develop-
ment of the entire nancial industry. Rajan and Zingales [22] have argued successfully that
a measure of the quality of accounting standards is a good proxy of the general conditions
of development in nancial markets. Accounting standards is an index re
ecting the quality
of disclosure of rms' annual reports (see Rajan and Zingales [22], p. 571). The poorer
such standards, the higher the information cost that nancial markets have to sustain to
determine the quality of an entrepreneur. Following the argument made above, by adding
the interaction with accounting standard (which should display a negative sign), the bank
concentration interaction may lose signicance. As the results in column (b) show, the
accounting standard interaction is indeed negative and signicant, but the bank concentra-
tion interaction coecient remain positive and signicant and actually the point estimate
increases considerably, from 0.84 to 1.13.
Another important variable regarding characteristics of the nancial industry, which
may also have an important eect on the bank concentration ndings, is an indicator of
development of capital markets. If it is true that market concentration may allow banks to
discriminate between older clients at the expenses of new entrants, such role should depend
on the overall ability of those newer rms to access external nance directly on capital
markets. Hence, we should expect that in countries with more developed capital markets,
highly dependent sectors should experience more rm entry. Again, if levels of bank con-
centration simply re
ects dierent stages in the development of nancial markets, the bank
15concentration interaction may lose signicance in a regression where we add the interaction
with a measure of capital markets development. The results in column (c) show that an
interaction term where capital market development is measured by stock market capitaliza-
tion is indeed negative and signicant. Yet, the bank concentration interaction coecient
remains positive and signicant and actually unaltered with respect to the benchmark case.
Finally, the characteristics dening the legal environment in a country are also likely to
have an eect on the nancial system (see La Porta et al. [17]) and through this on the
market structure of the banking industry. Hence, indirectly, indicators of judicial eciencies
may also have an impact on industrial sectors' market structure through the same channels
discussed above. Column (d) presents the results of a regression in which an interaction
term with a measure of the extent to which laws are enforced in a country (see Rajan and
Zingales [22] for details) is added. This interaction is negative and signicant but the bank
concentration interaction term remains positive and signicant.
4.5 Is the eect heterogeneous across countries?
The robustness tests presented in the previous section indicate that bank concentration
appears to have a signicant eect on industry market structure that is independent from
that of variables proxying for the general level of development of the nancial industry. A
complementary, yet separate question, however, is whether the eect of bank concentration
identied by the interaction term diers depending on whether a country is characterized
by a high or low level of nancial development. More precisely, column (a) of Table 9
presents the benchmark regression of column (a) of Table 6, with the additional inclusion of
the bank concentration interaction multiplied by a dummy equal to one for countries above
the median in the level of bank development. The baseline interaction term is signicant
and maintains an unchanged coecient. The dummy interaction instead is not signicantly
dierent from zero. This result indicates that the level of bank development is not an
important discriminant to identify a possible cross-country heterogeneity in the eect of
bank concentration on industry market structure.
Column (b) repeats the same regression this time adding the bank concentration inter-
action multiplied by a dummy isolating countries with a high level of accounting standards.
This regression shows that the baseline interaction term is still positive and signicant, and
the dummy interaction is negative and also signicant. Focusing on the size of the two
coecients, it appears that the eect of bank concentration on rm size varies substan-
tially across countries: With respect to the baseline interaction term, the magnitude of the
eect is estimated to be approximately 60 percent weaker in countries characterized by a
16higher overall level of nancial development ( 1:143 0:448
1:143 ). Moreover, the coecient of the
baseline bank concentration interaction actually increases from 0.838 (the point estimate in
the benchmark regression of column (a), Table 6) to 0.99. Separating countries according
to their level of nancial development reveals how much stronger the eect of bank con-
centration is where rms have more constrained access to alternative sources of external
funding.
Informative results are also delivered by the regression where we add the dummy in-
teraction for countries with high market capitalization. As column (c) shows, the dummy
term is negative and signicant. This result indicates that, in fact, in countries where rms
have potentially broader access to capital markets the eect of bank concentration on rm
size is about 45 percent smaller. Similar to what shown above, the coecient of the base-
line bank concentration interaction also increases, reinforcing the fact that the role of bank
concentration on rm size is enhanced when alternative sources of nance are lacking.
Another regression was run adding the dummy interaction for countries with a higher
judicial eciency. As shown in column (d), even in this case the dummy term is negative and
signicant, being evidence that in countries with higher judicial eciency the eect of bank
concentration on rm size is reduced. As the coecients show, this eect is approximately
50 percent weaker in such countries. As in the previous regressions, the coecient of the
baseline bank concentration interaction increases considerably, conrming a substantially
heterogeneous eect of bank concentration across countries.
These robustness tests have delivered two important conclusions. First, it is less likely
that the nding about the relationship between bank concentration and average rm size
be due to alternative economic explanations. Second, the eect of bank concentration on
rm size is of heterogeneous magnitude across countries. This result indicates that where
the conditions for rm entry are more favorable, due to higher nancial development, the
eect of bank concentration is much weaker. At the same time, performing regressions
where countries are dierentiated along such dimensions show that the eect in countries
with poorer nancial development attributes is actually magnied.
Not of secondary importance, the tests also provide reassurance on the reliability of the
measure of average rm size as an indicator of industry market structure: taking each and
everyone of them separately, the regressions in the last two tables establish empirical evi-
dence on additional theoretical priors related to factors aecting industry market structure
that are independent from considerations related to bank concentration. In other words, the
fact that various indicators of nancial development and judicial eciency are signicantly
{ and plausibly { related to our measure of average rm size, reduces the likelihood that
17the measure of average rm size is just a \random" sequence of values which just happens
to be signicantly related with bank concentration.
4.6 Economic eect of bank concentration on average rm size
Bank concentration thus seems to have a signicant eect on the market structure of indus-
trial sectors, by contributing to increase the average rm size in sectors especially dependent
on external nance. This conclusion has interesting welfare implications. Banking market
structure would seem to have a role in the determination of market power in industries
where they provide most credit. By aecting the pattern of entry of new rms potentially
endowed with better technologies, and that of exit of older and perhaps less productive ones,
banking market structure should also have an eect on the pace of industries' technological
progress.
We can also gauge the economic magnitude of the eect of banking market structure
on industry market structure. From the set of estimates presented in the previous sections,
we learn that, for example, the rm size dierential between a sector at the 25th percentile
of the distribution of external nancial dependence and one at the 75th percentile of the
same distribution, in going from a country at the 25th percentile of the distribution of bank
concentration to one at the 75th percentile, ranges between about a 5% and a 16% change
around the mean of the distribution of average rm size. While this study cannot quantify
the potential eect on the degree of market power in industrial sectors determined by such
increase in rm average size, it is still the case that the eect of bank concentration on
industry market structure is economically important.
5 Conclusions
This paper has investigated a new dimension of analysis of the economic role of bank-
ing market structure. The results show a signicant relationship between banking market
structure and the market structure of industrial sectors. Evidence from a cross-industry,
cross-country panel indicates that, controlling for industry and country xed eects, rms
in sectors more in need of external nance are of disproportionately larger size if they are
in countries whose banking sector is more concentrated. This is true even despite the fact
that sectors more in need of external nance are actually characterized, on average, by
smaller rms than sectors that are less dependent on external nance. This result is con-
sistent with theoretical priors suggesting that banks with market power may concentrate
lending to fewer rms with whom they have already established long lasting relationships,
18thus restricting credit access to newer entrants. At the same time, further investigation has
also shown that the eect of bank concentration is heterogenous across countries, with the
eect weaker in magnitude in countries with more developed nancial markets and a more
ecient legal structure.
Elucidating the nature of the relationship between banking market structure and in-
dustries' market structure enhances our overall understanding of the role of banks in the
economy. To the extent that bank concentration leads to more or less concentrated indus-
tries, this analysis exposes a potential link between characteristics of the banking industry
and rms' conduct in other industrial sectors. For example, depending on market struc-
ture, rms may have dierent pricing strategies for their products, or dierent incentives
in technology adoption. These considerations point to novel directions of analysis of the
impact of banking market structure on social welfare.
Moreover the analysis renes our knowledge about the eects of bank concentration on
growth. As Rajan and Zingales [22] have shown, the same performance in value added
growth could be achieved either due to the entry of new rms in that sector or due to
the growth of incumbent rms. Therefore, very dierent market structures could result
in similar patterns of value added growth. However, the growth of few rms, resulting in
increasing concentration, may translate into rising prots (which would be counted in value
added) but not necessarily into higher production. Both the economic signicance and the
normative implications associated with observing growth due to increasing prots versus
increasing output are likely to be very dierent.
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21Table 1: Summary Statistics
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Average Firm Size 581 1.365 1.368 -3.619 6.387
Share of Value Added 581 0.034 0.035 0.000 0.187
Growth Value Added 581 0.085 0.195 -1.479 1.117
Growth Number of Establishments 583 -0.011 0.105 -1.386 0.441
External Financial Dependence 578 0.012 0.302 -1.330 0.394
Bank Concentration 595 0.519 0.202 0.210 0.850
Bank Development 595 0.474 0.210 0.141 0.856
Accounting Standard 595 66.000 8.958 51.000 83.000
Bank Powers 595 2.044 0.502 1.250 3.250
Stock Market Capitalization 595 0.150 0.136 0.009 0.460
Rule of Law 595 8.791 1.676 5.000 10.000
Legal Origins 595 2.529 1.037 1.000 4.000
GDP per capita 595 2.887 0.715 1.134 3.683
Firm average size is computed as the natural logarithm of the ratio of total value added and number of
establishments of sector j in country k. The share of value added is sector j's share of manufacturing value
added in country k. Growth in value added is the average rate of growth of real value added for each
industrial sector in each country between 1989 and 1994. For some sectors in some countries the time period
may be dierent depending on data availability. Similarly, growth in number of establishments is the average
rate of growth in numebr of establishments for each industrial sector in each country between 1989 and 1994
or closer period available. External nancial dependence relates to mature companies (more than ten years
old), and is the fraction of capital expenditures not nanced with cash 
ow from operations. It is measured
on U.S. listed companies during the 1980's. Bank concentration is the sum of market shares (measured in
total assets) of the three largest banks in each country. The data on individual banking institutions are
from the IBCA-BankScope 1997 CD for the period 1989{1996. The values reported are averages over the
sample period. Bank development is the ratio of private domestic credit to GDP. Accounting standards is
an index ranking the amount of disclosure of companies' annual reports for each country. Bank powers is
a measure of regulatory restrictions on bank activities in each country. Stock market capitalization is the
ratio between stock market capitalization and GDP in each country. Rule of law is a measure of judicial
eciency in each country. Legal origins is an indicator of the origin of a country's legal system. GDP per
capita is the logarithm of income per capita in each country.
22Table 2: Pattern of Industry Structure and Financial Dependence Across
Industries
ISIC Industrial sectors Average Firm External Financial
code Size Dependence
323 Leather -0.18075 -1.33017
332 Furnitures and Fixtures -0.07799 0.32917
322 Wearing Apparel -0.06098 -0.02010
331 Wood Products 0.03113 0.24919
390 Other Manufacturing 0.10550 -0.05130
324 Footwear 0.28341 -0.57282
381 Metal Products 0.45290 0.04370
369 Non-Metallic Products 0.56688 0.15193
321 Textiles 0.63156 0.14100
342 Printing and Publishing 0.66766 0.13582
356 Plastic Products 0.67885 na
382 Non-Eletrical Machinery 0.77184 0.21660
361 Pottery, China etc. 0.80665 0.16338
385 Professional Goods 0.83971 0.19365
311 Food 0.99768 -0.05206
354 Petroleum and Coal Products 1.14540 0.16202
3841 Shipbuilding and Repairing 1.19241 0.04087
355 Rubber Products 1.41210 -0.12256
3825 Oce and Computing machinery 1.42803 0.26072
362 Glass and Products 1.45144 0.03103
383 Electrical Machinery 1.53288 0.23002
341 Paper and Products 1.67399 0.10438
372 Non-Ferrous Metals 1.81682 0.07313
3843 Motor Veichles 1.91521 0.10957
3832 Radio, TV and Comm. Equipment 1.95406 0.39350
384 Transport Equipment 1.97077 0.16324
352 Other Chemicals 1.98283 -0.18361
371 Iron and Steel 2.13695 0.08709
313 Beverages 2.20023 -0.14638
3511 Basic Industrial Chemicals 2.20340 0.07534
3513 Synthetic Resins 2.27204 -0.22668
3411 Pulp, Paper and Board 2.38646 0.12680
3522 Drugs and Medicines 2.66263 0.02752
314 Tobacco 4.03306 -0.37546
353 Petroleum Reneries 4.47356 -0.02171
Average rm size is computed as the natural logarithm of the ratio of total value added and number of
establishments of sector j in country k. External nancial dependence relates to mature companies (more
than ten years old), and is the fraction of capital expenditures not nanced with cash 
ow from operations.
It is measured on U.S. listed companies during the 1980's. The gures for rm size are calculated as simple
averages for each sector across all countries. The sectors are sorted in ascending order of average rm size.
23Table 3: Pattern of Industry Structure and Bank Concentration Across
Countries


















Average rm size is computed as the natural logarithm of the ratio of total value added and number of
establishments of sector j in country k. Bank concentration is the sum of market shares (measured in total
assets) of the three largest banks in each country. The data on individual banking institutions are from
the IBCA-BankScope 1997 CD for the period 1989{1996. The values reported are averages over the sample
period. The gures for rm size are calculated as simple averages for each country across all industries. The
sectors are sorted in ascending order of average rm size.
24Table 4: Rank correlations of average firms size
aus aut can n ger gre ita jap kor mex net nor spa swe tur uk den nzd por
aus 1
aut 0.76 1
can 0.92 0.79 1
n 0.78 0.77 0.81 1
ger 0.64 0.73 0.68 0.65 1
gre 0.89 0.78 0.85 0.81 0.63 1
ita 0.75 0.79 0.77 0.74 0.79 0.78 1
jap 0.77 0.75 0.72 0.79 0.68 0.73 0.78 1
kor 0.85 0.79 0.81 0.73 0.78 0.79 0.85 0.86 1
mex 0.56 0.63 0.62 0.59 0.65 0.59 0.71 0.55 0.63 1
net 0.84 0.64 0.75 0.73 0.58 0.73 0.75 0.72 0.76 0.59 1
nor 0.72 0.66 0.69 0.90 0.61 0.73 0.73 0.82 0.71 0.58 0.75 1
spa 0.77 0.79 0.77 0.74 0.76 0.74 0.88 0.78 0.85 0.60 0.70 0.71 1
swe 0.81 0.84 0.87 0.89 0.72 0.84 0.84 0.79 0.83 0.69 0.74 0.83 0.81 1
tur 0.68 0.69 0.64 0.70 0.62 0.79 0.75 0.66 0.71 0.64 0.72 0.70 0.68 0.76 1
uk 0.79 0.68 0.84 0.74 0.78 0.74 0.87 0.72 0.80 0.64 0.79 0.72 0.79 0.79 0.73 1
den 0.81 0.64 0.8 0.74 0.61 0.78 0.72 0.77 0.83 0.46 0.72 0.70 0.70 0.80 0.70 0.80 1
nzd 0.91 0.58 0.87 0.82 0.37 0.87 0.74 0.66 0.71 0.39 0.88 0.71 0.65 0.74 0.68 0.81 0.84 1
por 0.82 0.81 0.77 0.74 0.59 0.81 0.75 0.73 0.79 0.51 0.76 0.66 0.78 0.81 0.82 0.74 0.79 0.80 1
The pairwise correlations in the rst block of rows are based on the country ranks of average rm size, where average rm size is calculated using
information on number of establishments. The correlations in the bottom rows are calculated for New Zealand and Portugal using information
on number of rms.
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5Table 5: Residual Firm Size Net Of Industry and Country Fixed Effects








Low and High external nancial dependence sectors are those sectors respectively below or above the
median of the external nancial dependence distribution. Similarly, Low and High bank concentration refers
to countries with a bank concentration measure below or above the median. The numbers in the table are
mean values, calculated for each of the four clusters, of the residuals of a regression of average rm size on
industry and country dummies.
Table 6: Benchmark Regressions
Regressor (a) (b)
Share of value added 10.188*** 10.191***
(0.996) (0.996)




The dependent variable in all columns is average rm size. The share of value added is sector j's share of
manufacturing in country k. External nancial dependence for each sector j refers to the borrowing needs
of mature establishments. Bank concentration is the 3-bank ratio in each country. The results reported
in the rst column are based on OLS regression. The second column uses instrumental variables to check
for the possible endogeneity of bank concentration. The instruments were the measure of bank powers
and the indicator of legal origins. Industry and country dummy variables are included in all regressions
but the coecient estimates are not reported. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are reported in
parentheses. One asterisk indicates rejection of the null at the 10% signicance level, two asterisks indicate
5% signicance level, and three asterisks indicate 1% signicance level.
26Table 7: Robustness Tests. Outliers
Regressor (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g)
Share of value added 10.542*** 10.491*** 9.365*** 10.549*** 10.743*** 10.301*** 9.949***
(1.018) (1.336) (0.855) (1.077) (1.178) (1.053) (0.972)
External dependence  Bank Concentration 2.407** 0.813* 0.729** 0.893*** 0.617* 0.799** 0.736**
(1.106) (0.485) (0.316) (0.345) (0.334) (0.338) (0.330)
R2 .827 .840 .867 .853 .845 .846 .840
Observations 466 429 558 498 396 545 507
The dependent variable in all columns is average rm size. The share of value added is sector j's share of manufacturing in country k. External
nancial dependence for each sector j refers to the borrowing needs of mature establishments. Bank concentration is the 3-bank ratio in each
country. In column (a) the record for the three least dependent and three most dependent sectors were excluded from the regression. In column
(b) the record for the three countries with the lowest and the highest bank concentration were excluded from the regression. In column (c) the
records in the top 1% of the Cook's D distribution were excluded from the regression. In column (d) the records for Mexico and Turkey were
excluded from the regression. In column (e) the records for the non-european countries were excluded from the regression. In column (f) the
records in the top 10% of the distribution of growth in value added were excluded from the regression. In column (g) the records in the top 10%
of the distribution of growth in number of establishments were excluded from the regression. Industry and country dummy variables are included
in all regressions but the coecient estimates are not reported. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are reported in parentheses. One
asterisk indicates rejection of the null at the 10% signicance level, two asterisks indicate 5% signicance level, and three asterisks indicate 1%
signicance level.
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7Table 8: Robustness Tests. Proxying for Financial Development
Regressor (a) (b) (c) (d)
Share of value added 10.176*** 10.401*** 10.282*** 10.484***
(0.996) (1.006) (0.998) (0.990)
External dependence  Bank Concentration 0.865*** 1.128*** 0.847** 0.995***
(0.336) (0.378) (0.369) (0.360)
External dependence  Bank Development 0.076
(0.379)
External dependence  Accounting Standards -0.019**
(0.009)
External dependence  Capital Market Development -1.272**
(0.598)
External dependence  Rule of Law -0.123***
(0.050)
R2 0.842 0.843 0.843 0.843
Observations 564 564 564 564
The dependent variable in all columns is average rm size. The share of value added is sector j's share of manufacturing in country k. External
nancial dependence for each sector j refers to the borrowing needs of mature establishments. Bank concentration is the 3-bank ratio in each
country. Bank development is the ratio of private domestic credit to GDP. Accounting standards is an index ranking the amount of disclosure
of companies' annual reports for each country. Stock market capitalization is the ratio between stock market capitalization and GDP in each
country. Rule of law is a measure of judicial eciency in each country. Industry and country dummy variables are included in all regressions
but the coecient estimates are not reported. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are reported in parentheses. One asterisk indicates
rejection of the null at the 10% signicance level, two asterisks indicate 5% signicance level, and three asterisks indicate 1% signicance level.
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8Table 9: Heterogeneous Effect across Countries
Share of value added 10.205*** 10.340*** 10.311*** 10.473***
(0.995) (1.004) (0.998) (0.995)
External dependence  Bank Concentration 0.858** 1.143*** 0.998*** 1.481***
(0.358) (0.407) (0.356) (0.514)
External dependence  Bank Concentration  High Bank Dev. -0.081
(0.214)
External dependence  Bank Concentration  High Acc. Stan. -0.448*
(0.239)
External dependence  Bank Concentration  High Mkt. Cap. -0.550**
(0.233)
External dependence  Bank Concentration  High Law -0.766**
(0.374)
R2 0.842 0.842 0.843 0.843
Observations 564 564 564 564
The dependent variable in all columns is average rm size. The share of value added is sector j's share of manufacturing in country k. External
nancial dependence for each sector j refers to the borrowing needs of mature establishments. Bank concentration is the 3-bank ratio in each
country. High Bank Dev. is a dummy equal to one if bank development is above its median. High Acc. Stan is a dummy equal to one if
accounting standards is above its median. High Mkt. Cap. is a dummy equal to one if stock market capitalization is above its median. High
Law is a dummy equal to one if rule of law is above its median. Industry and country dummy variables are included in all regressions but the
coecient estimates are not reported. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are reported in parentheses. One asterisk indicates rejection
of the null at the 10% signicance level, two asterisks indicate 5% signicance level, and three asterisks indicate 1% signicance level.
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